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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3154 
___________ 
 
GEORGE K. TRAMMELL, III, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ALL OTHER COLLATERAL HEIRS OF  
THE ESTATE OF MARIE JONES POLK;  
JO ANN ROBINSON CARROLL, 
severally et al. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00272) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond*
____________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 29, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 4, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
*Due to a vacant judgeship in the District of Delaware, the Honorable Paul S. 
Diamond of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sat by designation. 
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 George K. Trammell III appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of 
his lawsuit.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Trammell brought this lawsuit against Jo Ann Robinson Carroll on behalf of 
himself and “all other collateral heirs of the estate of Marie Jones Polk,” Trammell’s 
deceased aunt.  The complaint, which is virtually unintelligible, appears to assert 
constitutional claims against Carroll on the basis that she deprived Trammell and other 
family members of property they inherited when Polk passed away in 1967.  Trammell 
insinuates that Carroll caused the deed showing Trammell’s ownership to “vanish” from 
the computer system at the Sussex County “recorder of deeds” and suggests that she 
created a fraudulent will purporting to be Polk’s. 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), on the basis that Trammell’s allegations are “totally implausible, 
attenuated, and devoid of merit,” and concluded that amendment would be futile.1
II. 
  (July 
6, 2011 Mem. 4.)  Trammell timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the 
District Court’s dismissal of Trammell’s complaint as frivolous for abuse of discretion.  
                                              
1 The District Court also denied without prejudice Trammell’s motion for a 
temporary restraining order because he failed to sign it.  Trammell never refiled a signed 
copy of his motion. 
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See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).  We may summarily affirm if no 
substantial question is presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6. 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Trammell’s complaint 
because the complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact and law.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Trammell’s factual allegations – especially that Carroll stole 
his property by making recorded deeds vanish from public records – are simply 
unbelievable.  See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.  Additionally, we cannot discern a legal basis 
for Trammell’s claims that Carroll violated his constitutional rights by stealing his 
property.  Nothing in the complaint suggests that Carroll is a state actor subject to 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), or that 
Carroll was involved in a conspiracy to violate Trammell’s constitutional rights.  
Furthermore, the District Court appropriately concluded that amendment would have 
been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Accordingly, since no substantial question is raised by this appeal, we will summarily 
affirm.2
                                              
2 We also agree with the District Court that, as a pro se litigant, Trammell may not 
represent parties other than himself.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also Osei-Afriyie ex rel. 
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
